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CASE STUDY
WILLIAM ALBERY, Ph.D.

Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFIT/SY)
Air Force Institute of Technology
2950 Hobson Way, Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-7765

Foreword
At the direction of the former Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) established the Air Force Center for Systems
Engineering (AF CSE) at its Wright Patterson AFB campus in 2003. With academic oversight by
a subcommittee on systems engineering, chaired by then-Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex Levis,
the AF CSE was tasked to develop case studies of SE implementation during concept definition,
acquisition, and sustainment. The committee drafted an initial case outline and learning
objectives, and suggested the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall analysis.
The Department of Defense is exponentially increasing the acquisition of joint complex
systems that deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighter. Systems engineering is the
technical and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining
robust, high-quality, affordable solutions. The Air Force leadership has collectively stated the
need to mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the Air Force. Gaining an
understanding of the past and distilling learning principles that are then shared with others
through our formal education and practitioner support are critical to achieving continuous
improvement.
The AF CSE has published nine case studies thus far including the A-10, KC-135 Simulator,
Global Hawk, C-5A, F-111, Hubble Telescope, Theater Battle Management Core System,
International Space Station and Global Positioning System (GPS). All case studies are available
on the AF CSE website, http://www.afit.edu/cse. These cases support academic instruction on SE
within military service academies, civilian and military graduate schools, industry continuing
education programs, and those practicing SE in the field. Each of the case studies is comprised of
elements of success as well as examples of SE decisions that, in hindsight, were not optimal.
Both types of examples are useful for learning.
Along with discovering historical facts, we have conducted key interviews with program
managers and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the various
prime and subcontractors. From this information, we have concluded that the discipline needed
to implement SE and the political and acquisition environment surrounding programs continue to
challenge our ability to provide balanced technical solutions. We look forward to your comments
on this E-10 case study and our other AF CSE published studies.
CAPT TIMOTHY J. DUENING, USN
Acting Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering
Air Force Institute of Technology
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the
United States Government.

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
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1 Systems Engineering Principles
1.1

General Systems Engineering Process

The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint systems and to deliver
needed capabilities to the warfighter. With a constant objective to improve and mature the
acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these
technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering process focused explicitly on
delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of
customers and stake holders must continue to evolve and mature. Systems engineering is the
technical and technical management process that results in delivered products and systems that
exhibit the best balance of cost and performance. The process must operate effectively with
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost
and schedule constraints. The systems engineering process changes as the program progresses
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures. The process also changes over the
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the
conduct of past programs. Systems engineering has a long history. Examples can be found
demonstrating a systemic application of effective engineering and engineering management, as
well as poorly applied, but well-defined processes. Throughout the many decades during which
systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools
have been developed, documented, and applied.
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging during
any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a welldeveloped set of requirements. Second, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, the
system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level components. And third,
the system requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all activities in all
intended environments. However, system requirements are not unchangeable. As the system
design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive to
satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and performance by changing or modifying
the requirements or set of requirements.
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process to
establish the system architecture. These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy
system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level
behavior and performance. Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage. System and subsystem design follows
the functional architecture. System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky,
expensive or time-consuming. Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occurs.
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce
any high-risk technology areas.
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is
applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex system of systems. Once a
solution is planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to
1

ensure satisfaction of requirements. Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs),
and measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, takes
place well before any component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs.
There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented in
the literature. These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution of
the systems engineering process. One can find systems engineering process definitions, guides,
and handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering Electronic Industries
Association, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and various Department of
Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations. They show the process as it should be applied by
today‟s experienced practitioner. One of these processes, long used by the Defense Acquisition
University (DAU), is depicted by Figure 1-1. It should be noted that this model is not
accomplished in a single pass. This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the lowest level
of definition of the design and its interfaces.

Figure 1-1. The Systems Engineering Process as Presented by DAU

1.2

DoD Directive 5000 Series

During President Richard Nixon‟s first term, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird faced
congressional attempts to lower defense spending. The cause was the Vietnam War and the
rising cost of defense acquisition, as well as emerging energy and environmental programs. Laird
and David Packard, his deputy, recognized the need for a mechanism to control and manage
spending especially with the coming fiscal constraint. In May 1969, Packard formed the Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council to give advice on the acquisition of major weapon systems.
It was chartered to review major milestones as well as conduct occasional management reviews.
One year later in 1970, Packard issued a policy memorandum that was to become the foundation
2

for the DoD 5000 series of documents which were first issued in 1971, and as of January 2008
have been reissued 10 times. The original purpose of the DoD 5000 series was to improve the
management of acquisition programs and include policy to streamline management, decentralize
execution, and use appropriate management structures.1 The 1971 issue of the DoD 5000 series
established the following program considerations (abbreviated here) pertaining to progression of
a program through the acquisition process.2
4. System need shall be clearly established in operational terms, with appropriate
limits, and shall be challenged throughout the acquisition process … Wherever
feasible, operational needs shall be satisfied through the use of existing military or
commercial hardware …
5. Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of acquisition and
ownership … Practical tradeoffs shall be made between system capability, cost
and schedule …
6. Logistic support shall also be considered as a principle design parameter …
7. Programs shall be structured and resources allocated to assure that the
demonstration of actual achievement is the pacing function … Schedules and
funding profiles shall be structured to accommodate unforeseen problems and
permit task accomplishment without unnecessary overlapping or concurrency.
8. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed … Models, mock-ups, and
system hardware will be used to the greatest possible extent to increase
confidence level.
9. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible. A determination of
operational suitability, including logistics support requirements, will be made
prior to large scale production commitments …
10. Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics, including risk
…
11. The source selection decision shall take into account the contractor‟s capability to
develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis …
12. Management information/program control requirements shall provide information
which is essential to effective management control … Documentation shall be
generated in the minimum amount to satisfy necessary and specific management
needs.
1.3

Evolving Systems Engineering Process

The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades, and has
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly
complex internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop the aircraft
and systems of the past was a process effective at the time. It served the needs of the
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. Notwithstanding, the cost
and schedule performance of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-managed
programs and ones with less-than-stellar execution. As the nation entered the 1980s and 1990s,
large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and behind schedule. Aerospace
3

industry primes were becoming larger and more geographically and culturally distributed and
worked diligently to establish common systems engineering practices across their enterprises.
However, these common practices must be understood and be useful both within the enterprise
and across multiple corporations and vendor companies because of the mega-trend of teaming in
large (and some small) programs. It is essential that the systems engineering process effect
integration, balance, allocation, and verification and be useful to the entire program team down
to the design and interface level.
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisition, including system-of-systems (SoS)
context, network-centric warfare and operations, an increased attention to human systems
integration, and the rapid growth in information technology. These factors are driving a more
sophisticated systems engineering process with more complex and capable features, along with
new tools and procedures. One area of increased focus of the systems engineering process is the
informational systems architectural definitions used during system analysis. This process,
described in the DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF)3, emphasizes greater reliance on
reusable architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations,
interoperability, information and data flows, and network service-oriented characteristics.
1.4

Case Studies

The systems engineering process to be used in today‟s complex system and system-ofsystems projects is a process matured and founded on principles developed in the past.
Examination of systems engineering principles used on programs, both past and present, can
provide a wealth of lessons to be used in applying and understanding today‟s process. It was this
thinking that led to the initiation of the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case study
effort, as well as the present continuation of that effort.
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems
engineering principles. They will facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term
consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success. The
systems engineering case studies will assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of
alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, the importance of using skills from multiple
professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied
functional data will be emphasized. When they are taken together, the student is provided realworld, detailed examples of how the process attempts to balance cost, schedule, and
performance.
The utilization and misutilization of systems engineering principles will be highlighted, with
special emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems engineering practices.
Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition management
and learning principles, to include whether:
every system provides a satisfactory balanced and effective product to a customer;
effective requirements analysis was applied;
consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering management standards was
applied;
effective test planning was accomplished;
4

there were effective major technical program reviews;
continuous risk assessments and management was implemented;
there were reliable cost estimates and policies;
they used disciplined application of configuration management;
a well-defined system boundary was defined;
they used disciplined methodologies for complex systems ;
human systems integration was accomplished;
problem solving incorporated understanding of the system within the larger operational
environment.
The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a system or system-ofsystems. Architectural elements of the system are allocated and translated into detailed design
requirements. The systems engineering process, from the identification of the need to the
development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and balance the
requirements, cost, and schedule to provide an operationally effective system throughout its life
cycle. Systems engineering case studies highlight the various interfaces and communications to
achieve this balance, which include:
The program manager/systems engineering interface between the operational user and
developer (acquirer) essential to translate the needs into the performance requirements for
the system and subsystems.
The government/contractor interface essential for the practice of systems engineering to
translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements.
The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the systems
engineering practice of integration and balance.
The systems engineering process must manage risk, both known and unknown, as well as
both internal and external. This objective will specifically capture those external factors and the
impact of these uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new
instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements, or contractor and government
staffing levels.
1.5

Framework for Analysis

The Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case studies will present learning principles
specific to each program, but will utilize the Friedman-Sage framework4 to organize the
assessment of the application of the systems engineering process. The Systems Engineering case
studies published by the Air Force Institute of Technology employed the Friedman-Sage
construct and matrix as the baseline assessment tool to evaluate the conduct of the systems
engineering process for the topic program.
The framework and the derived matrix can play an important role in developing case studies
in systems engineering and systems management, especially case studies that involve systems
acquisition. The Friedman-Sage framework is a nine row by three column matrix shown in
Table 1.
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Table 2. A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities
Concept Domain

Responsibility Domain
1. Contractor
Responsibility

2. Shared
Responsibility

3. Government
Responsibility

A. Requirements Definition and
Management
B. Systems Architecting and
Conceptual Design
C. System and Subsystem Detailed
Design and Implementation
D. Systems and Interface Integration
E. Validation and Verification
F. Deployment and Post
Deployment
G. Life Cycle Support
H. Risk Assessment and
Management
I. System and Program Management

Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 1 represent phases in the Systems Engineering
lifecycle:
A. Requirements definition and management;
B. Systems architecting and conceptual design;
C. System and subsystem detailed design and implementation;
D. Systems and interface integration;
E. Verification and validation;
F. Deployment and post deployment.
Three of the nine concept areas represent necessary process and systems management
support:
G. Life cycle support;
H. Risk assessment and management;
I. System and program management.
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman–Sage framework suggests
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle
processes in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the
process. Most other concept areas that were identified during the development of the matrix
appear to be subsets of one of these. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework
represent the responsibilities and perspectives of government and contractor, and the shared
6

responsibilities between the government and the contractor. In teaching systems engineering in
DoD, there has previously been little distinction between duties and responsibilities of the
government and industry activities. While the government has responsibility in all 9 concept
domains, its primary objective is establishing mission requirements.

Figure 1-2. Artist’s concept of the E-10A showing the BMC2 Suite
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2 E-10A System Description
2.1

Characteristics

The Northrop Grumman E-10 MC2A (Figure 2-1) was planned as a multi-role military
aircraft to replace the Boeing 707 based E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
Sentry, E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), and RC-135 Rivet Joint
aircraft in US service. It was based on the 767-400ER commercial airplane.

Figure 2-1. The E-10A (conceptual photo)

2.2

Development

In 2003, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, Boeing, Raytheon Multi-Sensor Command and
Control Aircraft (MC2A) Team was awarded a $215 million pre-system development and
demonstration (SDD) contract for the development of the aircraft. The MC2A was intended to be
the ultimate theater-wide combat control center.
While the Northrop Grumman E-8 J-STARS aircraft are a fairly recent development (1996),
they were the last such type to be based on the 707. Installing the high technology systems
envisaged for the MC2A on an increasingly obsolete airframe would not have provided the
capability required. The availability of powerful and reliable turbofans allowed a twinjet to be
considered such as the 767.
The goal of integrating air- and ground-search radars on a single airframe was still too
challenging and the decision was made 2003 to not pursue a full air and ground surveillance
single platform; electronic interference between the air- and ground-surveillance radars as well
as the power requirements for both systems were cited as the reason. 5 Instead the USAF decided
to plan on two separate E-10 fleets to be integrated with the proposed Space-Based Radar
system, air and space-based ELINT/signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets, and space-based
IMINT satellites. SIGINT is intelligence-gathering by interception of signals. ELINT refers to
electronic intelligence; IMINT refers to imagery intelligence. The E-10A would have been the
central command authority for all air, land, sea, and space forces in a combat theater. The E-10A
was also considered for use as a command center for unmanned combat air vehicles.
8

2.3

E-10A Capabilities

The E-10A was designed to be globally responsive and 24/7 persistent. The E-10A was to be
the hub of a spoke wheel that interacted with air, land, sea, and space assets (Figure 2-2). Land
and sea assets included joint services and combined connectivity. Space assets involved space
connectivity via satellites. BMC2 included the ability to develop an air tasking order of
execution, dynamic re-tasking, time critical targeting operations and improved combat
identification (friend or foe). Target evidence accrual in the BMC2 suite would allow for the
association, correlation and fusion of information from various sources as evidence towards
positive classification and/or identification. The E-10A was to provide battlespace awareness by
fusing persistent sensors. The Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) MP-RTIP radar
would provide enhanced detection capability of both ground moving targets as well as air
moving targets. UAVs could be controlled from the E-10A platform. The E-10A‟s persistent
surveillance capability, horizontal integration, and moving target (air and ground) defense would
enable faster, better informed decisions which would shorten the kill-chain.

Figure 2-2. E-10A Capabilities6

The capability of the E-10 MC2A was to be raised incrementally, with each phase known as
a "spiral."
Spiral 1 - MP-RTIP
This version would have provided substantial Joint Cruise Missile Defense (CMD)
capability with focused Air Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) modes and augment the E-8
Joint STARS in the ground surveillance role.
9

Figure 2-3. USAF E-8C Joint STARS

Spiral 2 - AWACS Capability
This version would have replaced the E-3. It was expected that the Spiral 2 version would
use a variant of the Boeing Wedgetail's Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array.ii

Figure 2-4. USAF E-3 Sentry

Spiral 3 - SIGINT Platform
This version was intended to replace a wide range of SIGINT/ELINT aircraft including
the RC-135 Rivet Joint. No plans existed to develop this version.

ii

It was designed for Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) under “Project Wedgetail.” The 737 AEW&C has
also been selected by the Turkish Air force (under “Project Peace Eagle”) and the Republic of Korea Air Force
(“Project Peace Eye”) and has been proposed to Italy and the UAE.
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Figure 2-5. USAF RC-135 Rivet Joint

2.3.1 Scale-back
In January 2006, the Air Force FY07 budget request revealed a reshaping of the E-10
program, with the cancellation of the E-10A SDD program, but maintained funding for the
development and testing of a single demonstration aircraft, now known as the E-10A Technology
Development Program (TDP) (Appendix C). The TDP would flight test the MP-RTIP WideArea Surveillance (WAS) radar, and conduct flight demonstrations of the E-10A's CMD
capability. The SDD elimination was designed to be a cost cutting measure and part of a larger
reorganization and redefinition of the Air Force's mission including the retirement of the E-4B
and F-117 fleets, as well as the elimination of all but 58 B-52s.
2.3.2 Cancellation
The E-10 finally disappeared at the end of FY2007 as budget pressures and competing
priorities pushed it completely out of the budget (Appendix D). The USAF maintained funding
for the MP-RTIP radar and that may eventually put the radar on the E-8, or on a new aircraft,
possibly the same airframe as the next aerial tanker. The smaller version of the MP-RTIP AESA
designed to be flown on the RQ-4B Global Hawk has been flight tested on the Scaled
Composites Proteus aircraft.
2.4

Specifications (767-400ER)7

General characteristics:
Crew: 2
Length: 201 ft 4 in (61.3 m)
Wingspan: 170 ft 4 in (51.9 m)
Height: 55 ft 4 in (16.8 m)
Empty weight: 229,000 lb (103,872 kg)
Max takeoff weight: 450,000 lb (204,116 kg)
Powerplant: 2× P&W PW4000-94 or GE CF6-80C turbofan, PW: 63,300 lbf or GE:
63,500 lbf (PW: 281.6 kN or GE: 282.5 kN) each
11

Performance:
Maximum speed: Mach 0.86 (568 mph, 913 km/h)
Cruise speed: Mach 0.80 (530 mph, 851 km/h)
Range: 5,600 nmi (10,370 km)
Service ceiling: 40,100 ft (12,200 m)

Figure 2-6. Boeing B767-400 ER Physical Characteristics

12

7

Table 3. E-10 History of Significant Events6
Radar Technology Insertion Program (RTIP) Operational Requirements Document (ORD)

Jun 99

MP-RTIP Milestone II Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Approval by USD/AT&L

Jan 00

J-STARS RTIP Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

Feb 00

MP-RTIP Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) Agreement

Nov 00

MP-RTIP Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP) approved by USD/AT&L

Nov 00

MP-RTIP Requirements Revalidated to USD/AT&L Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
Memorandum
MP-RTIP ADM (Restructure from RTIP)

Nov 00

Special Study 8 validated need for MP-RTIP (JROC approval)

Apr 01

Multi-sensor Command & Control Aircraft (MC2A) CONOPS (COMACC approval)

May 01

MP-RTIP analyses of alternatives (767 platform recommendation/cost effectiveness)

Feb 02

CSAF/SECAF approval of 767-400ER

Feb 02

USD/AT&L (Strategic and Tactical Systems) Approval of 767-400

Mar 02

MP-RTIP 767 Sensor Study (aka Madigan Study, evaluated radar size)

Mar 02

MP-RTIP sensor size/placement on 767 study

Jun 02

Dec 00

FY 04-09 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directs Air Force to acquire four aircraft with MP-RTIP Jul 02
MC2A Sensor Trade Study (program office)

Aug 02

2

Multi-sensor C Functionality (MC2F) Mission Needs Statement (JROC approval)

Dec 02

MC2A Initial Requirements Document (AFROCC approval)

Jan 03

Mission Design Series (MDS) Designation for MC2A as E-10A

Jan 03

OIPT Program Acquisition Summary Report

Apr 03

E-10A Abbreviated Acquisition Summary Approved

Apr 03

MC2A Air Force Way Ahead (CSAF/SAF direction)

Apr 03

JROC Revalidation of MP-RTIP Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) & MCA CONOPS Review

Jul 03

E-10A MC2A Capabilities Development Document (CDD) (AFROCC approval)

Nov 03

MP-RTIP ADM

Dec 03

Joint Staff/J6 Interoperability Certification of E-10A CDD

Jun 04

E-10A Working IPT (WIPT) for Onboard BMC2

Sep 04

E-10A CDD JROC Approval

Oct 04

Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753 Restructuring E-10A Program

Dec 04

CSAF Decision on Way Forward Post PBD 753

Jan 05

E-10 Technical Feasibility Study Competed

Dec 05

QDR Directs E-10 Demo program; cancellation of the E-10A SDD program

Jan 06

OSD/ATL & SECAF sign E-10 ADM

May 06

FY08 POM Deliberations

Jun 06
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3 The E-10 Story
The E-10A Multi-Sensor Command & Control Aircraft (MC2A) program was initiated in
2001 by Commander Air Combat Command (COMACC) General John Jumper. It ran from 2001
to 2006 at a cost of $1.2B when it was cancelled. The intent was to recapitalize aging AWACS/
J-STARS 707 fleets and insert the latest radar/communications technology on a new wide body.
The Air Force envisioned the E-10A as a replacement for three specialized aircraft: the E-8
J- STARS air-to-ground surveillance aircraft, the E-3 AWACS air-to-air surveillance aircraft and
the RC-135 Rivet Joint SIGINT aircraft. The Air Force terminated the program in 2006 due to
pressing Service budget constraints.
The E-10A was being developed to provide precision targeting for killing air and ground
targets as well as time critical mobile targets including surface-to-air missiles, missile launchers,
etc. The E-10A was going to shorten the timeline from the sensor to the shooter, support the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and F/A-22 concept of operations (CONOPS) and ensure that if the
enemy shot at us we could rapidly target and eliminate the enemy. The E-10A‟s warfighting
advantages included shortened sensor-to-shooter timelines, rapid decisive operations with respect
to battle management and communications decisions close to the fight, persistent surveillance,
detection and tracking of cruise missiles and horizontal integration.
The E-10A was designed with basically three subsystems. The MP-RTIP sensor, which was
largely designed prior to work beginning on the other subsystems, was an active electronically
scanned array radar that concurrently supports both air and ground based missions. The aircraft
platform was the second subsystem. This subsystem was based on modifying a Boeing 767-400
extended range aircraft to carry the radar subsystem as well as the third subsystem, the BMC2
subsystem. The BMC2 subsystem included the radios, networking, computers, and software used
by operators (both on and off-board the aircraft) to perform missions such as CMD and time
sensitive targeting. Example application level functionality included track fusion, image
exploitation, sensor planning and control, weapon planning, and engagement workflow control.
From a business perspective, the work was accomplished across a number of Government
and contractor organizations, contracts, and locations. The principal Government acquisition
organization was the Electronic Systems Center, supported by MITRE, located at Hanscom Air
Force Base in Bedford, Massachusetts. The prime contractor was Northrop Grumman located in
Melbourne, FL. Other Northrop Grumman sectors were involved as well as other companies
such as General Dynamics, BAE, Boeing, and Raytheon. Hundreds of engineers were involved
in the total program.
The FY04 Defense Planning Guidance8 stated the "Air Force should program to deploy, by
FY10, four aircraft equipped with the MP-RTIP radar for CMD and ground moving target
indicator (GMTI) capability. The Air Force should assess transitioning to a new, wide-body
aircraft as a part of the FY04 POM submission”. The Abbreviated Acquisition Summary signed
by Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) in April 03 delayed the
4-aircraft orbit requirement to FYl3. These aircraft were projected to have a spiral 1.0 capability
with an open architecture that would allow growth into a full increment 1 (spiral 1.3) capability
as documented in the JROC approved (JROCM 2907-04, 10 Nov 04) E-10A MC2A Capabilities
Development Document. The FY05 Defense Authorization Act reduced the FY05 program by
$115M. During the FY06 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) build the AF reprogrammed
$165M into FY06 and $244M into FY07. The Air Force FY06 POM input to Office of Secretary
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of Defense (OSD) put the E-10 program on track to deliver four operational aircraft capable of
meeting the FY04 DPG requirement of a four-aircraft CMD orbit.8 However, the fourth aircraft
was projected for delivery by 2015, a slip of two years.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense released a PBD 753 on 23 December 2004. The PBD
put in place a $600M reduction ($300 M in FY06 and $300M in FY07) to the E-10 program
(Appendix E). In addition to the non-programmatic reductions the PBD also directed the Air
Force to restructure the E-10 program.
The E-l0A System Program Office (SPO) (ESC/MA) and the E-10 System Management
Office (AFC2ISRC/SM) provided three options to the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and
the Air Force Chief of Staff on 21 Jan 05. Option 1 maintained the same program content found
in the FY06 POM input, but delayed Initial Operational Capability (IOC) to 2018. Option 2
moved the test aircraft effort from a "prototype" effort (i.e., 767-400 test aircraft with a planned
follow on to operational E-10A aircraft hosted on767-400 platforms) to a 767-400 MP-RTIP
radar development aircraft. The actual E-10A operational wide body platform would be
determined at a later date. This option would also give the AF the opportunity to move directly to
an E-10A/B with ground (J-STARS-like) and airborne (AWACS-like) sensor capability on the
same aircraft, if technology allowed. The ground and airborne radar capabilities would have had
more capability than the current J-STARS and AWACS radars. Option 3 hosted a less capable
version of the new MP-RTIP radar planned for a wide body platform on the current, but updated
engines on the J-STARS aircraft. The SECAF and the Air Force Chief of Staff directed
implementation of Option 2 and no further study on Option 3. Option 2 could still meet a 2018
IOC date for an E-10.
During the fall of 2005, the E-10 System Management Office, SPO and SAF/AQI conducted
a Technical Feasibility Study on an E-10A/B, as requested by ACC/DO. The consulting firm of
Booz Allen Hamilton accomplished a six-month, $l M study into combining the functions of an
E-10A and a Block 40/45E-3 AWACS onto a single platform, in support of COMACC's 2025
Vision Force Flight Plan. Results were a definitive YES-FEASIBLE, and were briefed to
COMACC on 13 Feb 06. At the same time OSD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed
the AF to cancel production of the E-10A prior to a Milestone B decision and to continue with a
Technology Demonstrator - essentially the "prototype" mentioned above.
At the brief, the Center asked ACC to sponsor an analysis of alternatives in order to
transition the program from an E-10A to an E-10A/B in accordance with the Combat Air Force‟s
vision. COMACC decided that ACC needed another year to examine its 707 draw down
recapitalization plan, which would be the precursor to any OSD-directed formal analyses of
alternatives.
The decision by COMACC was to support the Technology Development Program (TDP) per
QDR. On 30 May 06, SECAF & OSD/ATL signed an ADM approving the E-10 TDP. The plan
was to flight test the MP-RTIP radar and conduct live demonstrations of CMD in FY 10/11.
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3.1

Acquisition Strategy

The E-10A was being fielded under an evolutionary acquisition approach and incremental
development strategy. The acquisition approach was complex with two sole source efforts and
one competitive selection. The MP-RTIP radar was being developed on a 50/50 share contract
with Northrop Grumman and Raytheon. The aircraft was procured through the Aeronautical
Systems Center Wright-Patterson AFB OH via a Federal Acquisitions Regulation Part 12 sole
source Contract with Boeing. Northrop Grumman was selected as the contractor for the BMC2.
The E-10A Weapon System Integration (WSI) contract was a tri-company contract of Northrop
Grumman-Raytheon-Boeing.
The E-10A acquisition strategy panel decided in Dec 2002 that the MC2A portion of the
program, the weapon system integration, would best serve the Air Force if Northrop Grumman,
Raytheon, and Boeing teamed on the effort. It was decided not to compete the sensor portion of
the effort. Several companies possessed the BMC2 core competency so it was beneficial to
compete that part of the program. This acquisition strategy was approved by the OSD 22 April
2003. The final Request for Proposal was received 23 Apr 2003 and the proposal was delivered
the next day 24 April. The AF awarded a pre-System Development and Demonstration noncompetitive contract to Northrop Grumman to develop the MC2A and also awarded the company
a competitive contract to develop the BMC2. The Radar acquisition MP-RTIP was to be
performed under a 50/50 teaming arrangement of Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, two fierce
competitors. This forced marriage of two competitors presented program management and
technical challenges to protect intellectual property while efficiently developing the system..
When the funding was cut for the MP-RTIP development, the 50/50 work share between
Raytheon and Northrop Grumman was no longer viable. Northrop Grumman and Raytheon
continued development of MP-RTIP under a modified work share agreement.
E-10A Acquisition Strategy
The E-10A acquisition
Aircraft Procured by
ASC/GR
E-10A Program Elements
history
began within the RTIP,
- FAR Part 12 Contract
BMC2
awarded to Boeing for a
-Provider competitively selected
which
was a pre-planned
commercial 767-400ER to be
-Northrop-Grumman selection
used as the E-10A testbed
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two-dimensional
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- Current Contract with NG-Raytheon
Team for Phase I Design and Phase II
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E-10A Weapon System Integration (WSI)
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Northrop Grumman , Raytheon, Boeing Team
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significant increases in ground
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surveillance capability to the
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warfighter as well as a new
Figure 3-1. The E-10A Program Elements9
CMD capability. Following a
meeting of the Defense Acquisition Board, on 28 January 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense
(AT&L) approved J-STARS RTIP‟s entry into Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD). However, an EMD contract was never awarded.
BMC2 Subsystem s for GMTI,
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ISR Exploitation Tools

Boeing
767-400ER
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MP-RTIP Radar
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1) The MP-RTIP Radar program was to develop modular, scalable 2D-AESA radars
employing fourth generation, airborne phased array antenna technology and
commercially available digital signal processing technology. The E-10A with MP-RTIP
was to deliver a surface surveillance capability (GMTI and SAR imagery) as well as a
focused AMTI capability to support the CMD mission. The MP-RTIP program also
developed smaller radar for the Global Hawk UAV. For the Global Hawk MP-RTIP
variant, only the development effort was funded by the E-10A program.6

Figure 3-2. The MP-RTIP radar and its planned location6

2) A Boeing 767-400ER commercial aircraft was a Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 12
purchase; it was to be militarized for E-10A unique requirements. The first aircraft was
purchased during the development phase and was to serve as the E-10A testbed. An
additional six aircraft were to be purchased during the production phase and modified to
become operational platforms. Had the MP-RTIP been designed to be shorter than 21 ft a
smaller variant of the 767-400 (200 or 300) may have been sufficient.9 The BMC2 suite
included all of the non-radar and non-aircraft subsystems including the central computing
architecture, networks, data storage, data manipulation and exploitation, communications
and data link capabilities.
3) The E-10A WSI contract was for the integration of the MP-RTIP radar, the platform, and
the BMC2.
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Figure 3-3. E-10A Functional Architecture6

3.1.1 Contractors
The E-10A program was managed through three contracts: the MP-RTIP Contract, the
contract to purchase the commercial Boeing 767-400ER, and the E-10A WSI contract. The
E-10A and MP-RTIP workflow is depicted in the figure below.

E-10A/MP-RTIP Workflow
Boeing: Everett & Kent, WA
• 767-400ER aircraft
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NGC:
El Segundo & San Diego, CA
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•Aircraft mod

Raytheon:
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• MC2A System Eng

Raytheon:
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Northrop-Grumman Corp:
Melbourne, FL

• T/R Modules
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•
•

Radar movement
Aircraft movement

MC2A Program Mgmt
Systems Engineering
Platform Integration
Flight Test
BMC2

Figure 3-4. The Geographical Separation of the Contractors and the Planned Workflow 6
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3.1.2 MP-RTIP
The MP-RTIP contract strategy leveraged off two major defense contractors in a contractor
teaming arrangement. Northrop Grumman Corp. and Raytheon Electronic Systems were brought
together and equally shared the MP-RTIP development and production workscope. The
workscope was broken out taking advantage of each company‟s strengths, and further refined
with a 50/50 target workshare arrangement. The MP-RTIP contractor team and workshare are
depicted below.

Figure 3-5. The MP-RTIP Contractor Teaming Arrangements6
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Figure 3-6. The MP-RTIP
Contractor Workshare6
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the radar. In order to protect their parts of the MP-RTIP they considered proprietary they began
„over labeling‟ their subsystems and components as “proprietary.”
The Air Force learned that by forcing a marriage between two competitive contractors,
coordination and integration of their final product can be difficult. The Air Force can potentially
place itself in a position to be called upon to intervene in decisions of what is and isn‟t
proprietary, which is a position the Air Force does not want to be in. As a result, meaningful risk
assessments are difficult to make because of the proprietary communication barrier. Worse, the
risk assessments can be too optimistic and it is easy to hide issues behind the proprietary barrier.
Problems continue to be worked in corporate stovepipes, rather than being elevated in a timely
manner to the cross-corporate technical leadership. Although the government forced the two
companies to team, both companies had to come to agreement on the nature of the teaming e.g.
work share. That agreement was based on the program effort and end products as defined at the
beginning of the program. As has been described here, the program changed dramatically over
time and the assumptions of the original agreement were no longer true. Although NG and
Raytheon continued to develop MP-RTIP, the restructuring and eventual cancellation of the E-10
program forced changes in the original teaming agreement.
One can‟t force a marriage with a “pre-nuptial agreement” then change the agreement after
the marriage and expect it to last. This described the forced arrangement between two
competitors, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon on the radar development and the reduction of
funds and restructuring during the program.
3.2

BMC2

The BMC2 suite included all of the non-radar and non-aircraft subsystems including the
central computing architecture, networks, data storage, data manipulation and exploitation,
communications and data link capabilities. The BMC2 suite was to have mission tailorable seats
for personnel/operators, next generation battle management decision aids, tailored, fast, and
smart information push to the warfighter and sensor-to-shooter capability for air and ground
moving targets. The BMC2 was going to provide horizontal integration including intelligence
systems and interfaces as well as a distributed common ground system and a regional global
information grid. The advanced communications included a Joint Tactical Radio System,
SATCOM (satellite communications), HF, UHF, VHF antennae, Single Channel Ground and
Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), Link 11, 16iii and a multi-platform common data link.6

iii

Link 11, 16 are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secure radio systems that provide Line-Of-Sight
(LOS) communications. They interconnect air, surface, subsurface, and ground-based tactical data systems, and are
used for the exchange of tactical data among the military units of the participating nations. Links 11, 16 will be
deployed in peacetime, crisis, and war to support NATO and Allied warfare taskings.

20

BMC2 Suite

MP-RTIP WAS RADAR

B767-400ER Platform

Figure 3-7. E-10A with the two internal subsystems in a Boeing 767-400ER aircraft6

3.2.1 The Role of the BMC2 Suite
The concept of the on-board command and control personnel and their duties included a
modular, reconfigurable workstation arrangement with common work space stations. The various
sections could be reconfigured quickly depending on the mission and curtains could be drawn to
partition groups with common duties. (Figure 3-8) The reconfigurable ground staff area could be
set up for different mission needs analyses.

Figure 3-8. Conceptual arrangement of the BMC2 suite of the E-10A6

One of the major issues that surfaced during the E-10A/B program was: “Do we need an
airborne command post? If so, how many people should be onboard the aircraft in order to
conduct a BMC2 mission given the proposed capabilities of the E-10?” In their analysis of
conducting a BMC2 mission on the E-10A, Aptima developed a model using team optimal
design methodology that proposed a crew of 25 to perform the BMC2 mission.10 Some planners
felt by having large numbers of personnel onboard the E-10B, the Air Force put personnel at risk
unnecessarily. Others felt the BMC2 staff needed to be as close to the kill chain as possible and
by having them onboard the aircraft they could enable decisions closer to the fight and shorten
sensor-to-shooter timelines. If they could successfully perform their duties on the ground in a
command center rather than airborne, there was reduced risk in performing the mission. Another
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consideration that arose was the physics question of simultaneously operating multiple radar
systems (one for air and one for ground) on a single platform without creating mission
degradation. This was never demonstrated.
The Spiral C consideration, SIGINT/ELINT, onboard the same platform was never planned
as well. This group of specialized personnel onboard the E-10C would have to have a quiet
environment perhaps secluded from the other BMC2 staff. The physics of having high energy
radars coupled with SIGINT/ELINT technology was never demonstrated on a single platform
during the E-10A program.
3.2.2 767-400ER Commercial (Green) Aircraft
A contract was awarded to the Boeing Company, Integrated Defense Systems in Seattle,
Washington for a Boeing 767-400ER commercial aircraft (Figure 3-9). During SDD, this aircraft
was to be provided as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to the WSI Contractor to be
militarized for E-10A Weapons System Requirements and serve as the E-10A testbed. It never
underwent systems integration and the aircraft was later sold as a very important person transport
aircraft to the country of Bahrain.

Figure 3-9. The Boeing 767-400ER6

3.2.3 Weapon System Integration (WSI)
The E-10A WSI pre-SDD contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman via letter contract
dated 14 May 2003 and definitized 24 October 2003 with an effective date of 1 May 2003. The
program was managed by Integrated Systems (IS) Airborne Ground Surveillance & Battle
Management Systems (AGS & BMS), located in Melbourne, Florida. The tri-co team included
elements of Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems in Melbourne, Florida, Raytheon Company
Space and Airborne Systems in El Segundo, California and the Boeing Company, Integrated
Defense Systems in Seattle, Washington. The selection of Northrop-Grumman as the BMC2
provider was announced on 10 Sep 04. The BMC2 effort was to be accomplished by NorthropGrumman under this WSI contract.
3.2.4 MC2A Evolution
The plan for MC2A evolution was to implement the function of the Joint STARS E-8C into
the E-10A in Spiral 1. Spiral 2 would leverage E-3 AWACS SENTRY Block 40/45 technology
into the E-10A. (Figure 3-10).6
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Figure 3-10. MC2A Evolution6

3.3

System Development Plan

3.3.1 Development Phases
The E-10A program, as the next generation WAS manned airborne platform, was structured
to deliver CMD, advanced integrated ground and air surveillance and targeting capabilities, as
well as associated BMC2.
The approved pre-SDD acquisition strategy was comprised of four lanes6:
13. ASC/GR's purchase of one Boeing 767-400ER that would become GFE to the
WSI prime contractor for modifications that would result in an E-10A testbed for
the large variant of the MP-RTIP radar (Contract Awarded, 15 Aug 03).
14. Competition of the BMC2 subsystem selected provider to become a directed
subcontractor to the WSI prime contractor (Contract Awarded, 14 Sep 04).
15. Award of the WSI contract to integrate MP-RTIP, BMC2, and aircraft subsystems
to result in an E-10A Weapon System (Contract Awarded, 14 May 03).
16. Continuation of the MP-RTIP radar development effort to build and test the E10A's radar that would become GFE to the WSI prime contractor (SDD Contract
Awarded,
30 Apr 04).
Leveraging from the successes of the pre-SDD acquisition execution, the SDD acquisition
strategy was single-laned: subsequent to a successful Milestone B, the existing WSI contract
with Northrop Grumman was to be modified to develop, build, and test an E-10A Weapon
System, modifying the GFE 767-400ER, integrating the GFE MP-RTIP radar and developing the
BMC2 subsystem to meet the user's requirement within cost and schedule.
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3.3.2 Program Budget Decision 753
Prior to PBD 753, the E‑10A program was proceeding to a Milestone B decision in April
2005. A congressional funding reduction of $300M in FY05 as well as the OSD‟s FY06-FY07
funding reductions ($300M) that accompanied the restructuring direction resulted in cancellation
of the scheduled Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board review. Restructuring options were
briefed to senior Air Force leadership and the resultant recommended option was proposed to the
Director, Defense Systems (D, DS) in February 2005. This recommended option provided for the
developmental flight test and verification of the MP-RTIP WAS sensor during the TDP. This
MP-RTIP flight test schedule was consistent with the approved Acquisition Program Baseline
(APB) for MP-RTIP, a separate ACAT (Acquisition Category) ID program.iv The TDP includes
Developmental Test and Evaluation of the MP-RTIP radar and execution of the CMD
demonstrations. Agreement in principle was reached with the D, DS to proceed in planning for
the restructured program and to seek formal OSD approval of the restructured program in the
summer of 2005. In December 2005, Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) II eliminated
funding for E-10A SDD and Production. The QDR Report was consistent with the PDM II
direction. A subsequent Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT), chaired by OSD/AT&L
(DS), on 9 March 2006, codified the way forward for implementing the E-10A WAS TDP.
The stakeholders (ACC and Department of Defense) held different visions of what the
E-10A was going to provide for the warfighter. OSD supported the MC2A portion of the
program but did not support the BMC2. ACC wanted an airborne BMC2 capability but never
settled on how many aircraft to request to field for the mission. Early in the E-10 program the
Air Force and Navy discussed a common airframe. However, this proposal would have required
the Navy to buy a 767-sized aircraft, considerably larger than the 737-sized aircraft they
preferred. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy was prepared to compromise their own plans by
agreeing to the use of a common airframe and the Navy dropped out of the planning.. The
differences should have been settled on in the earlier stages of the program.
ACC was an early supporter and stakeholder of the E-10A program. Chief of Staff of the Air
Force and former COMACC General Jumper was fully supportive of the E-10. “The E-10
delivers transformational integration of the sum of the wisdom of our manned, unmanned, and
space platforms ending up with a cursor over the target.” ACC approved the CONOPS on 8 May
2001 that described the flow down of requirements. There was clear customer sponsorship of the
program. ACC played a very active role in the E-10A program throughout the 4-5 years it was
active. ACC served as the MP-RTIP lead operating command. They supported the development
of the E-10A MP-RTIP and then helped develop CONOPS and operational requirements
documents for the Global Hawk MP-RTIP. ACC supported Air Force Operational Test and
Evaluation Center for all Global Hawk MP-RTIP OT&E activities. ACC represented the CAF

iv

ACAT I programs are Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). ACAT I programs have two subcategories. ACAT ID, for which the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) is USD (A&T) is one of the programs.
The D refers to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), which advises the USD (A&T) at major decision points.
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(Combat Air Forces) as the decision-making authority for POM submissions for the Global
Hawk MP-RTIP development life cycle.
The E-10A program was considered dead as of the beginning of FY08 however on 1 Jun
2007 the Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman $12.2M for work related to the E-10A. ESC
Hanscom awarded the 12 month contract for a “seamless continuation of pre-SDD program to
complete limited risk reduction activities in the areas of BMC2 mission execution and BMC2 kill
chain without introducing new requirements.”11 The funds covered the BMC2 and kill-chain risk
reduction of the WSI program efforts during the first phase of technology development.
3.4

Model-Based Systems Engineering12

The Government and industry employed Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
principles as an integral part of the E-10A‟s systems engineering approach. MBSE lends itself
nicely to large-scale, distributed, real-time systems like the E-10A. The use of MBSE helped
balance requirements and reduce risks associated with the development of the E-10A.
The application of MBSE with robust, Unified Machine Language-based executable models
for the E-10A requirements and initial design work was a success. This approach mitigated risks
associated with large heterogeneous organizations attempting to collaborate to build a leading
edge large scale distributed real-time system.
There were certain technical and sociological (that is people working with people) challenges
that were encountered on the E-10A program. These challenges were significant contributors
toward the decision to use an MBSE approach for both systems and software engineering.
3.4.1 MBSE and the Sociological Challenges of the E-10A Program12
For programs with the complexity, size, and intended long system life-cycle that was
envisioned for the E-10A, the sociological issues should not be underestimated by a program
office. These issues are not typically given the attention they need. Too often the immediate
focus is on what technologies should be part of the solution, rather than on how a large number
of geographically separated engineers can collaborate to get a job done. From Figure 3-4 (on
page 18) one can see the geographical separation of the contractors on the E-10A program was
formidable.
The first conclusion one could reach is that there was a significant need for common
mechanisms to allow a variety of people to collaborate about the system. Associated with this
was the need to achieve common understanding of key technical decisions by the project team.
While this sounds simple and obvious, developing an approach that supports meaningful
reasoning can be a significant challenge. Clearly, there was a critical need for quality data at
higher levels of abstraction than software source code. Tools and data were needed to be used
that support:
Multi-disciplinary collaboration
Multi-organizational collaboration
Information hiding
Multiple levels of abstraction
Data currency
Data consistency
Data correctness
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Multi-disciplinary and organizational collaboration is a must for effective systems
engineering. Individual groups using their own tools and data put at risk the usefulness of their
results. Reasons include the difficulty of people understanding each other‟s results when they use
different tools, languages, and data; and the likelihood that these differences result in a
significant manual effort to keep the individual results synchronized. The experience from the
E-10A program was that given the fast-paced nature of system development, manual
synchronization was doomed to fail.
For example, computer/network performance analysts have typically performed a manual
translation of the software design into formats that performance analysts/tools can use. Since
software engineers are paid to show up to work and build software, the performance engineers
quickly end up with a representation of the software that is outdated and decreases the value of
their analysis. In addition, if technical management (such as chief engineers and chief architects)
are to take action based on the analysis, they end up having to invest significant time
understanding both the software and performance engineers‟ representations of overlapping data.
The combination of stale data and different “look and feel” decreases usefulness which can drive
up program cost.
Information hiding is an important technique. Information hiding techniques have recently
become important in a number of application areas.13 Digital, audio, video, and pictures are
increasingly furnished with distinguishing but imperceptible marks, which may contain a hidden
copyright notice or serial number or even help to prevent unauthorized copying directly. Military
communications systems make increasing use of traffic security techniques which, rather than
merely concealing the content of a message using encryption, seek to conceal its sender, its
receiver or its very existence. A reason for information hiding in a project like the E-10A was the
need to truly hide data from certain people, yet expose it to other people. For example, since the
E-10A was a military project, parts of it were classified at different security levels. While
classified data must be protected, one must also ensure that data are available to as many people
that need it when they need it and if they have a need to know.
The last three bullets shown on page 25 are not exciting, but are “bread and butter” principles
that can be difficult to fully support. Data currency is about knowing whether one is looking at
up-to-date information (or at least, being able to map the data to specific builds or milestones).
Large programs can take several years to develop, and system sustainment might be done over a
number of decades. Left unmanaged, there will be a number of mistaken decisions made simply
because the person did not realize they were viewing obsolete data. Consistency aims to achieve
harmony among data both horizontally (e.g., between software components) and vertically
(e.g., between system and software abstraction levels). Too often, requirements and design
artifacts are loosely structured textual statements or graphics (e.g., briefing charts) where there is
minimal computer-based enforcement of consistency available.
The cost of manual enforcement (not to mention that this sort of work is not something
people tend to like to do – and therefore don‟t do particularly well) grows as the amount of
requirements and design data increase. Finally, data correctness refers to being able to assess the
impact of a design choice on the system‟s ability to meet requirements. Typically, software
engineering has a long way to go before it approaches the rigor of more established fields such as
radar engineering with respect to analysis.
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There were a number of technical challenges identified early in E-10A planning that were
anticipated. Challenges identified include:
Location transparency (internal and external to the aircraft)
Shared resources (E-10A supported numerous users in a dynamic environment)
Range of hard and soft timing and performance requirements
Portability of crew (within E-10A and with other Air Force Platforms)
Reuse of legacy components
Security
Openness and extensibility
System dynamics (dealing with changing environment and faults)
The ones focused on most in arriving at the need for an MBSE approach were the “moving
parts” related challenges. Here, moving parts refer to system dynamics. It is often not until the
integration and testing phases that issues with things like system dynamics, performance, and
subsystem/component interfaces are discovered. The cost of rework at that point can be
prohibitive (not to mention by that time one is often running short on both schedule and
funding). A contributor to inadequately detecting system dynamic (moving parts) type problems
in the requirements and design phases of a program are the tools and products used during these
phases.
Requirements and design products are often static in nature. For example, one typically
writes requirements as textual sentences with the key word “shall” in it; e.g., “The system shall
track objects that are moving on the ground.” Likewise, design artifacts tend to be static pictures
of components and their relationships. Given these fixed products, it should not be a surprise that
an engineer has trouble foreseeing dynamic problems.
The approach used for the E-10A system and software initial design included:
Architecture-centric focus;
Executable UML-based design models integrated across security levels;
Publish and subscribe communication in the executable design model;
Integrated design and analysis, including use of the UML Profile for Schedulability,
Performance, and Time;
Computer enforced linkage of requirements and design;
Early involvement of testers in definition of system threads.
3.4.2 Architecture-Centric Approach for the E-10A
An architecture-centric approach is one where there is an emphasis on the patterns of
connections among system components with defined constraints. The identification of critical
system views and the accompanying approach for addressing these views can be a powerful
mechanism for making people aware of key technical decisions. E-10A used a variation of the
architecture views proposed by Bruce Douglass14 which are subsystem and component view,
distribution view, concurrency and resource view, safety and reliability view, and deployment
view. A view for security was added. The set used by E-10A is shown in Figure 3-11. While
Northrop Grumman was committed to producing a robust model of the design, they also thought
that emphasis on these views was in itself a useful abstraction and had the benefit of not risking
the reader getting lost inside a large UML model.
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The
E-10A/BMC2
software
architecture description document
Northrop Grumman produced
ended up having sections for these
views where the view diagrams
were extracts from the UML
system model.
It is a key point that the
MDSE process did not “replace”
the
contractor‟s
Capability
Maturity
Model
Integration
system engineering process, but
rather enhanced the process with
robust model driven practices and
tools as shown in Figure 3-12.
Figure 3-11. E-10A Architecture Views
The
associated
architecture
modeling concept was an enabler
to perform comprehensive analysis of the system trade space early in the product life cycle for
both the E-10A development and its planned integration with other C2ISR platforms.

Figure 3-12. Model Driven Systems Engineering Features12
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4 Summary/Conclusion
In summary, the E-10A program was an ambitious program. Perhaps it was too ambitious.
The concept of incorporating three missions on one platform may have led to its demise. The
physics of generating high energy radar (MP-RTIP) from an airborne platform that was also
performing a critical signal listening (SIGINT) mission had never been demonstrated. The
program was terminated in 2006 for more pressing Service priorities. Although there was ample
support and involvement from the direct customer, ACC, all stakeholders and decision makers
(OSD) didn‟t necessarily agree on the scope of the E-10 program.
Those aircraft the E-10A was to replace continue to age and the mission and roles the E-10A
was to fill remain. The E-10A had a major data integration and dissemination role of ingesting
data from many sources including Global Hawks and fusing those data making a wide range of
data products available to the enterprise. It will be interesting to see as the GMTI Initial
Capabilities Document and GMTI analyses of alternatives evolve at ACC whether this concept
of an airborne element performing this function is a requirement of the next generation system.
Two products from the E-10 program have been successfully transitioned to other
applications. A scaled version (1.5 ft X 5 ft) of the MP-RTIP radar has been developed for the
Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle to track moving ground targets. The application of
MBSE with robust, UML-based executable models for the E-10A requirements and initial design
work was a success. MBSE applied to the program mitigated risks associated with large
heterogeneous organizations attempting to collaborate to build a leading edge large scale
distributed real-time system like the E-10A. MBSE is now being applied to other programs by
DoD and companies including MITRE, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin to name a
few.
ACC is currently performing analyses of alternatives for the ISR mission and may come to
the conclusion that something like the E-10A is still needed. In a recent Defense News article14
COMACC Gen William Fraser is quoted as saying “the AF is looking at how its next generation
radar aircraft potentially could track threats from maritime targets to ballistic missiles.” The
article goes on to say “This is reminiscent of the AF‟s cancelled E-10A program, however, the
AF‟s ancient Boeing 707-based E-8s are suffering numerous problems, including wing spar
cracks and engines that can barely power the jets on takeoff in hot climates. The AF is examining
whether it will keep those jets in service or replace them. One option being examined is using a
version of the Navy‟s new Boeing 737-based P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which is
being outfitted with an advanced 360-degree sea-scanning radar.”
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Appendix A: A Framework for Systems Engineering Concept and Responsibility Domains
Concept Domain

Responsibility Domain
1. Contractor
Responsibility

2. Shared Responsibility

3. Government
Responsibility

A. Requirements
Definition and
Management
B. Systems
Architecting and
Conceptual Design
C. System and
Subsystem Detailed
Design and
Implementation
D. Systems and
Interface Integration
E. Validation and
Verification
F. Deployment and
Post Deployment
G. Life Cycle Support

H. Risk Assessment
and Management
I. System and Program
Management

This Friedman-Sage matrix is included as an exercise for the student. Following the explanation in Section 1.5
of this Case Study develop 4-6 systems engineering learning principles from the case study and then insert them into
the matrix based on whether they were a contractor responsibility, a government responsibility, or a shared
responsibility between the government and the contractor.
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Appendix C: E-10A TDP AS ADM 30 May 06
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Appendix D: Term TDP AS ADM 30 May 07
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Appendix E: PBD
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Appendix F: DPG
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Appendix G: Acronyms
AESA
AEW&C
AMTI
AWACS
BMC2
CMD
CONOPS
COMACC
DAU
DoD
DoD AF
EMD
GFE
GMTI
GPS
JROC
ISR
J-STARS
MBSE
MC2A
MESA
MP-RTIP
OSD
PBD
POM
SAR
SDD
SIGINT
TST
2D-AESA
UAV
WAS

Active Electronically Scanned Array
Airborne Early Warning and Control
Air Moving Target Indicator
Airborne Warning and Control System
Battle Management Command and Control
Cruise Missile Defense
Concept of Operations
Commander, Air Combat Command
Defense Acquisition University
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Architecture Framework
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Government Furnished Equipment
Ground Moving Target Indicator
Global Positioning System
Joint Requirements Oversight Council
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
Model Based Systems Engineering
Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft
Multirole Electronically Scanned Radar
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Program Budget Decision
Program Objective Memorandum
Synthetic Aperture Radar
System Development and Demonstration
Signals Intelligence
Time Sensitive Targeting
Two-Dimensional Active Electronically Scanned Array
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Wide Area Surveillance
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